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INTRODUCTION
N commenting on women's admission to Harvard Law School in
1950, then Dean Erwin Griswold reassured anxious alums that this
development was not "very important or very significant." "Most of
us," he noted, "have seen women from time to time in our lives and
have managed to survive the shock. I think we can take it, and I
doubt that it will change the character of the School or even its atmos-
phere to any detectable extent."' Such perceptions remain common.
In one representative survey, less than half of the male attorneys
* Professor of Law, Stanford University: Director of the Keck Center on Ethics
and the Legal Profession. B.A., 1974, J.D., 1977, Yale University. This legal Article is
adapted from a lecture given as the Pope, Cahil, and Devine Lecture on Professional-
ism, in April 1994 at Northwestern Law School, and from an article appearing in a
forthcoming anthology, Ethic Issues in Professional Life (Joan C. Callahan ed., forth-
coming). I am grateful for the comments of Ralph Cavanagh, Cynthia Epstein, Ed-
ward Frueh, Lawrence Friedman, Ronald Gilson, Robert Gordon, Judith Resnik,
William Simon, and Kim Taylor-Thompson.
1. Erwin Griswold, Developments at the Law School, 1950 Harv. L Sch. Y.B. 10.
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(compared with three-quarters of females) believed that women's en-
try would have major consequences for the profession.2
Such perceptions are not without irony. For centuries, women were
excluded from the professions on the assumption that they were dif-
ferent; once admitted, the assumption typically has been that they are
the same. By and large, women have been expected to practice within
established structures; those structures have not sufficiently changed
to accommodate women.
Feminism seeks to alter these patterns. In the process, it raises con-
cerns both about the role of women and about professional roles.
This Article, informed by contemporary feminist jurisprudence, pro-
ceeds along two dimensions. Discussion first centers on challenges to
professional roles, relationships, and the delivery of services. Analysis
then turns to issues of gender bias in the workplace and women's un-
derrepresentation in positions of the greatest power, status, and re-
ward. Both discussions build on values traditionally associated with
women that are undervalued in traditionally male-dominated profes-
sions. Before turning to these main areas of concern, some prelimi-
nary observations are in order about feminism as an organizing
framework.
I. FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS
Any exploration of feminist perspectives needs some working defi-
nition of feminist theory. And any effort to provide such a definition
runs up against a threshold problem. The term encompasses an in-
creasingly diverse body of work that does not readily coexist under
any single label. Although this is not the occasion for a full review, a
few general comments are in order about feminists' differences over
gender difference and feminists' theories about theory.
A. Differences over Difference
Feminist theory grows out of a substantive commitment to gender
equality and a methodological commitment to gender as a focus of
analysis. By definition, feminism presupposes commonalities among
women and differences between the sexes that demand attention. Yet
the extent and origins of those differences are a matter of longstand-
ing dispute. How much importance should be attached to biology, to
the experience of subordination, to sex-based divisions of labor, or to
social constructions of masculinity, femininity, and sexuality, are all
issues of intense debate even (indeed, particularly) among feminists.
For those interested in professionalism, the most contested issue is
whether women approach their occupational role from a distinctive
perspective. One important strand of feminist theory, represented by
2. Bill Winter, Survey: Women Lawyers Work Harder, Are Paid Less, But
They're Happy, 69 A.B.A. J. 1384, 1388 (1983).
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Carol Gilligan, argues that women tend to reason in a "different
voice": they are less likely than men to privilege abstract rights over
concrete relationships, and are more attentive to values of care, con-
nection, and context.3 Building on this relational approach, some
feminists argue that women bring a distinctive perspective to profes-
sional roles, and that their values may foster more humane, less hier-
archical structures for professional life.4 Other feminists, including
Catherine MacKinnon, have emphasized women's subordination as a
source of women's distinctive interests and concerns.5
Claims about gender difference in the profession draw on a variety
of narrative accounts and empirical research. For example, some
small-scale studies find that women rank competitiveness as less desir-
able than do men;6 that women in certain decision-making contexts
are more inclined than men to prefer collaborative, interactive leader-
ship styles;7 and that women professionals are more likely to value
interpersonal client relationships, 8 public service work,9 and em-
pathetic reasoning processes.10
The strength of such analyses lies in their demand that values tradi-
tionally associated with women be valued and that we focus on trans-
forming social institutions, not just assimilating women within them.
3. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's De-
velopment (1982).
4. See Mona Harrington, Women Lawyers: Rewriting the Rules 251 (1993);
Rand Jack & Dana Crowely Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Decisions: The
Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers 56-58 (1989); Naomi Cahn, Styles of
Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1045 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women's
L.i. 39, 55 (1985); see also Richard J. Maiman et al., Gender and Specialization in the
Practice of Divorce Law, 44 Me. L. Rev. 39, 51 (1992) (finding female lawyers more
likely than male lawyers to be client rather than craft oriented); sources cited infra
notes 10-14.
5. Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1989); Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 11 (1985) (comments of
Catherine MacKinnon).
6. Jean Lipman-Blumen, Connective Leadership: Female Leadership Styles in the
21st-Century Workplace, 35 Soc. Persp. 183, 200-01 (1992).
7. Id.; Patricia Yancey Martin, Rethinking Feminist Organizations, 4 Gender &
Soc'y 184 (1990); Judith B. Rosener, Ways Women Lead, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec.
1990, at 120.
8. John M. Smith, Women and Doctors 146-48 (1992); see also Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Feminization of the Legal Profession, in Lawyers in Society: Vol. 3 Compar-
ative Theories 227-28 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989) (citing studies
on academics, medicine, and law); Natalie Angier, Bedside Manners Improve as More
Women Enter Medicine, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1992, § 4, at 18 (noting that women
spend longer with patients).
9. Angier, supra note 8, § 4, at 18 (citing Association of American Medical Col-
leges surveys finding young female physicians more willing to work in impoverished
areas and to treat poor patients); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 226, 228 (indicat-
ing that women lawyers are more likely to cite social service as reason for entering the
profession and for entering legal aid, public interest, and government service work).
10. Jack & Jack, supra note 4, at 56-58; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 55.
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Yet efforts to claim an authentic female voice illustrate the difficulty
with theorizing from experience without homogenizing it. To divide
the world solely along gender lines is to ignore the ways in which bio-
logical status is experienced differently by different groups under dif-
ferent circumstances. There is no "generic woman,"" and relational
feminism has not sufficiently acknowledged variations across culture,
class, race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation.' Nor have rela-
tional frameworks addressed the contextual forces that lead the same
women to vary in their expression of "women's" values and character-
istics in different social circumstances.
The celebration of gender difference risks not only oversimplifying,
but also overclaiming. Recent research raises substantial questions
about how different women's voice in fact is. Psychological surveys
generally find few attributes on which the sexes consistently vary.13
Even for these attributes, gender typically accounts for only about five
percent of the variance.'4 The similarities between men and women
are far greater than the disparities, and small statistical distinctions do
not support sweeping sex-based dichotomies. Most empirical studies
of moral development or altruistic behavior do not find significant
gender distinctions.'5 Nor does related research on managerial behav-
ior reveal the consistent sex-linked variations that relational feminism
11. See Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Fem-
inist Thought 114, 117 (1988).
12. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Deceptive Distinctions: Sex, Gender, and the Social
Order 185 (1988); Catherine G. Greeno & Eleanor E. Maccoby, How Different is the
"Different Voice"?, 11 Signs 310, 312-16 (1986). For an anthology reviewing this line
of work, see An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Mary
Jeanne Larrabee ed., 1993).
13. Alice H. Eagly, Sex Differences in Social Behavior: A Social-Role Interpreta-
tion 31 (1987); Eleanor E. Maccoby, Gender and Relationships: A Developmental Ac-
count, 45 Am. Psychologist, 513,513-15 (1990); see also Kay Deaux & Brenda Major,
A Social-Psychological Model of Gender, in Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Dif-
ference 89 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990).
14. Eagly, supra note 13, at 115; see also Linda D. Molm & Mark Hedley, Gender,
Power and Social Exchange, in Gender Interaction and Inequality 1, 6 (Cecelia B.
Ridgeway ed., 1992); Kay Deaux, From Individual Differences to Social Categories:
Analysis of a Decade's Research on Gender, 39 Am. Psychologist 105, 110-11 (1984);
Janet Shibley Hyde, Meta-Analysis and the Psychology of Gender Differences, 16
Signs 55, 64-68 (1990).
15. For altruism, see Alfie Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature: Altruism
and Empathy in Everyday Life 82 (1990); Carol Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman
63-67 (1992). For moral behavior, see Epstein, supra note 12, at 76-77; Greeno &
Maccoby, supra note 12, at 315.
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would suggest.' 6 Employees who confront the same occupational
pressures tend to converge in work-related responses. 7
What emerges from these and related studies is the importance of
context in eliciting traits traditionally associated with women.18
Changes in the gender composition and social expectations of a partic-
ular professional setting significantly affect the likelihood that "femi-
nine" attributes will be expressed. A representative case in point
involves female judges. Surveys of judicial decision-making reflect no
consistent gender differences even in areas involving women's rights
or sentencing for violent crimes against women.' 9 Yet all-female judi-
cial associations display greater sensitivity to traditionally female val-
ues than their male-dominated counterparts. Programs for women
judges often focus on issues such as combatting bias, accommodating
family concerns in courthouse administration, and ensuring more em-
pathetic treatment of vulnerable witnesses.2" Similarly, feminist polit-
ical groups and all-female law firms generally have established less
hierarchical, more participatory structures than comparable male-
dominated institutions.2
B. Theories about Theory
Taken together, these divergent findings on sex-based difference
underscore the need for greater contextual analysis. To that end, some
strains of feminist jurisprudence have sought to recognize difference
without universalizing its content. Drawing on postmodern and prag-
matic traditions, these frameworks emphasize multiple sources of
identity and avoid abstract, acontextual theory. Both postmodern and
16. Epstein, supra note 12, at 173-84; Barbara Forisha, The Inside and the Out-
sider: Women in Organizations, in Outsiders on the Inside: Women and Organiza-
tions 9, 23 (Barbara L. Forisha & Barbara H. Goldman eds., 1981); Sue Joan
Mendelson Freeman, Managing Lives: Corporate Women and Social Change (1990);
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Impact of Hierardical Structures on the Work Behavior
of Women and Men, in Women and Work: Problems and Perspectives 234, 236-45
(Rachel Kahn-Hut et al. eds., 1982).
17. Paula England & George Farkas, Households, Employment, and Gender. A
Social, Economic, and Demographic View 137-41 (1986); Epstein, supra note 12, at
179-81; Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Sex Differences During Occupational Socialization, 26
Acad. Mgmt. J. 492, 495 (1983).
18. See England & Farkas, supra note 17, at 137-41; Epstein, supra note 12, at 130-
61; Molm & Hedley, supra note 14, at 6-8; Tavris, supra note 15, at 290-96; Ways Men
and Women Lead, 69 Harv. Bus. Rev. 150, 150-51, 154-56, 159-60 (1991) (comments
of Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Jane Mansbridge, and Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld).
19. John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 308, 319-20 (1981) (finding no gender difference among judges, except for
female judges' greater propensity to sentence female offenders to prison); Thomas G.
Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and
Process Ramifications, 47 J. Pol. 596, 607 (1985) (finding no significant male/female
difference on issues of criminal law and women's rights).
20. Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Femi-
nism, 99 Yale L.J. 1913, 1948-50 (1990).
21. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law 131-61 (2d ed. 1993).
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pragmatic approaches to difference recognize that women's voice
speaks in more than one register; its expression depends heavily on
the social circumstances and cross-cutting affiliations of the speaker,
including not only gender but class, race, ethnicity, age, and sexual
orientation. 22
Such approaches can also recognize the strategic costs as well as
values in asserting a "woman's point of view." Emphasizing males'
interest in abstract principles and females' concern for interpersonal
relationships reinforces longstanding stereotypes that have restricted
opportunities for both sexes. However feminist in inspiration, any du-
alistic world view is readily appropriated for non-feminist objectives.
For example, as analysis of gender bias in part III suggests, profes-
sional women too often find that emphasis on their distinctive capaci-
ties and needs reinforces structures that are separate but not equal.
A more effective strategy would neither exaggerate nor deny gen-
der differences. We can avoid sweeping claims about woman's essen-
tial nature while noting that particular groups of women under
particular social conditions practice their professions based on differ-
ent expectations and experiences than men. We also can observe that
values traditionally associated with women-care, cooperation, con-
text-have been undervalued in traditionally male-dominated profes-
sions, and that their absence impoverishes the lives of both sexes. In
short, we can advocate visions of professionalism that resonate with
women's experiences, but on the basis of feminist commitments, not
biological categories.
The following analysis offers one such vision. Given the diversity
within contemporary feminism, this Article makes no claim to repre-
sent the feminist perspective. Discussion does, however, focus on is-
sues where most feminists have found common ground.
II. PROFESSIONAL ROLES, RELATIONSHIPS AND PROVISION
OF SERVICES
About a decade ago, when feminist theories first began to influence
work on the legal profession, they often provoked considerable skep-
ticism. I particularly recall one discussion of an article on relational
values and legal practice. A prominent leftist scholar summed up
widespread views among his male colleagues by observing that
"twenty years ago we called this socialism. All that's new here are the
22. For example, see Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social Criticism Without
Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism, in Feminism/
Postmodernism 13, 35 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990); Judith Grant, Fundamental
Feminism: Contesting the Core Concepts of Feminist Theory 107, 124, 160-63 (1993);
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 884 (1990);
Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581,
585 (1990); Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1699, 1707 (1990).
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citations." When I circulated an early draft of this Article to some of
my colleagues, part of its analysis met with greater politeness but simi-
lar reservations. In critics' view, much of the feminist critique of role
morality, lawyer-client relationships, and the provision of legal serv-
ices does not seem uniquely feminist.
My response may not entirely satisfy either feminists or critics,
although for different reasons. While feminists are not always eager
to relinquish claims of originality, it does not undercut their critique to
acknowledge its overlap with other critical perspectives. The values
that traditionally have been associated with women are not solely wo-
men's values. They also have played an important part in other tradi-
tions from which critics of professional norms have drawn, such as
humanism, critical legal studies, Kantian moral theory, and Judeo-
Christian ethics.
Yet what feminism offers is much more than a new set of references.
It also offers a new constituency, a new urgency, and a new rationale
for transformative visions. What drives feminists' critiques is the dis-
satisfaction and disadvantage that women disproportionately experi-
ence under traditional professional structures. What gives those
critiques broader force is the universality of their underlying values-
equality, empathy, care, and cooperation.
Twenty years ago, socialism was right in much of its critique, if not
always in its proposed solutions, just as earlier legal profession critics
were right in their diagnoses, if not always effective in their strategies
for reform. If a new "ism" can refocus attention on longstanding
problems and build new alliances for change, that is contribution
enough.
A. Role Morality Reconsidered
The mayor and Montaigne have always been two people, clearly
separated .... An honest man is not responsible for the vices or the
stupidity of his calling .... 23
During the early 1930s, anthropologist Ralph Linton introduced the
term "role" into the social science literature to describe rights and
duties belonging to a particular status. Ethical theorists have bor-
rowed the term to differentiate role morality and personal or ordinary
morality. The conventional assumption, captured by Montaigne, is
that individuals holding certain occupational positions assume ethical
obligations that may diverge in significant ways from those acceptable
within society generally. The theory is that some institutions can func-
tion effectively only if participants adjust their sense of moral respon-
sibility in light of particular institutional needs.
23. Montaigne, quoted in Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L
Rev. 3, 20 (1951).
1994]
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Conventional accounts of professional ethics rest on related prem-
ises about professional roles. The prevailing assumption is that indi-
viduals' ability to assert legal rights rests on having lawyers who
defend, not judge, their clients.24 Fulfilling professional responsibili-
ties may require actions that run counter to individuals' personal
moral values.
From a feminist perspective, this traditional concept of role-differ-
entiated morality is unsatisfying in several respects. At the most fun-
damental level, feminists join other critics in questioning the
distinction between ordinary morality and role morality. As they
note, "no one is ever an abstract moral agent."' Individuals always
function within relationships and make ethical choices in view of their
particular responsibilities as parents, friends, spouses, employees, and
so forth. If, as feminists have long insisted, the personal is political, it
is also professional. Both role morality and ordinary morality assume
that individuals "in different circumstances and with different abilities
have different obligations."26
A related criticism is that traditional concepts of role do not ad-
vance analysis about what those different obligations demand. All too
often, individuals deny personal accountability for professional acts on
the ground that they are just "doing their jobs." Yet this strategy at-
tempts to avoid responsibility even as it is exercised. The choice to
defer to role is itself a moral choice and needs to be justified as such.
Conventional approaches to professional ethics fail to provide ade-
quate justifications. By encouraging deference to abstract role-based
norms, these approaches devalue the contextual and relational dimen-
sions that are central to feminist theory and that should be central to
ethical analysis. The result is to impoverish both personal and profes-
sional identity.
Conventional understandings of role morality for lawyers illustrate
what is lost under these traditional conceptions of professional ethics.
To understand what feminists find problematic about current ethical
norms, it is helpful first to review the obligations that those norms
entail. In general, attorneys are expected to act as neutral partisans
who should represent their clients zealously within the bounds of the
law regardless of their own views concerning the justness of the
cause.27 Although lawyers may not assist fraudulent, harassing, or il-
24. For critical accounts of the conventional view, see David Luban, Lawyers and
Justice (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. 589, 589-659 (1985); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some
Moral Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. 1, 1-24 (1975).
25. Alisdair Maclntyre, What Has Ethics to Learn from Medical Ethics?, 2 Phil.
Exchange 37, 46 (1978).
26. Virginia Held, The Division of Moral Labor and the Role of the Lawyer, in The
Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 60, 67 (David Luban ed., 1984).
27. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101, DR 7-101, EC 7-1
(1980); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 (1992); William Simon, The
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legal conduct, they are given wide latitude to protect client interests at
the expense of broader societal concerns. For example, they may
present evidence that they reasonably believe to be inaccurate or mis-
leading as long as they do not know it to be false; they may withhold
material information in civil cases that the other side fails to discover;
they may invoke technical defenses to defeat rightful claims; and they
may remain silent about a client's prior wrongful conduct even when
disclosure would prevent substantial financial harm or physical risk to
innocent parties.'
The rationale for this morally neutral partisanship rests on two pri-
mary lines of argument. The first invokes utilitarian, instrumental rea-
soning. It assumes that the most effective way to achieve justice is
through the competitive clash of two zealous adversaries, and that
their effectiveness depends on trusting relationships with clients. On
this view, an adversarial system will function fairly only if individuals
have full confidence in the loyalty and confidentiality of their
advocates.
From feminists' standpoint, this conventional justification for the
partisanship role is too abstract and acontextual to yield morally satis-
fying outcomes. The assumption that truth or fairness necessarily re-
sults from adversarial clashes is neither self-evident nor supported by
empirical evidence. It is not the way most professions or most legal
systems pursue knowledge.29 Moreover, the conventional paradigm
presupposes a fair contest between combatants with roughly equal re-
sources, capacities, and incentives. Such equality is all too infrequent
in a social order that tolerates vast disparities in wealth, renders most
legal proceedings enormously expensive, and allocates civil legal
assistance largely through market mechanisms.3 0
In response to such criticisms, defenders of partisan norms rely on
an alternative rights-based justification. On this view, respect for cli-
ents' individual autonomy implies respect for their legal entitlements
and requires undivided loyalty from their legal advisors. By absolving
attorneys from accountability for their clients' acts, the traditional ad-
vocacy role encourages representation of those most vulnerable to
public prejudice and state oppression. The promise of non-judgmen-
tal advocacy also encourages legal consultation by those most in need
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, Wis. L Rev. 29, 36
(1978).
28. For an overview, see Marvin E. Frankel, Partisan Justice 25-29 (1980);
Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 221-56 (1992); Deborah L Rhode,
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 Case W. L. Rev. 665, 667-76 (1994).
29. Luban, supra note 24, at 67-103; Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031, 1036-37 (1975).
30. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Cone Out Ahead" Speculations on the Lin-
its of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95, 97-114 (1974); Rhode, supra note 24, at
595-605.
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of ethical counseling. Any alternative system, it is argued, would
threaten rule by an oligarchy of lawyers."
Feminists join other critics in raising two central objections to this
rights-based defense of neutral partisanship. The first is that it col-
lapses legal and moral entitlements. It assumes that society benefits
by allowing clients to pursue whatever objectives the law permits. Yet
conduct that is antithetical to the public interest in general or to
subordinate groups in particular sometimes remains legal. For exam-
ple, prohibitions may appear too difficult or costly to enforce, or deci-
sion makers may be uninformed, overworked, or vulnerable to
interest-group pressures. In such contexts, lawyers may have no par-
ticular moral expertise, but they at least have a more disinterested
perspective than clients on the ethical dimensions of certain practices.
For attorneys to accept moral responsibility is not necessarily to im-
pose it. Unless the lawyer is the last in town (or the functional
equivalent for indigent clients), his or her refusal of the neutral parti-
san role does not preempt representation. It simply imposes on cli-
ents the psychological and financial cost of finding alternative
counsel.32
A second problem with rights-based justifications for partisanship is
that they fail to explain why rights of clients should trump those of all
other individuals whose interests are inadequately represented. For
feminists, that failure is most apparent when it threatens the welfare
of disadvantaged groups including women, or of especially vulnerable
third parties, such as children in divorce cases and consumers of haz-
ardous products. In such circumstances, partisanship on behalf of or-
ganizational profits inadequately serves values of individual
autonomy. Case histories of the Dalkon Shield and asbestos litiga-
tion, as well as less politicized financial scandals, illustrate the human
misery and social costs that can accompany unqualified advocacy. 33
Finally, the submersion of self into role carries a price not only for
the public in general, but for lawyers in particular. The detachment of
personal and professional ethics often
encourages an uncritical, uncommitted state of mind, or worse a
deep moral skepticism .... In a large portion of his daily experi-
31. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Prob-
lem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 629-30. For a critical
perspective, see Wasserstrom, supra note 24.
32. Luban, supra note 24, at 166-74; Rhode, supra note 24, at 621-26.
33. See Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial
(1985); OPM Leasong Sources, Inc., in The Social Responsibility of Lawyers 184
(Phillip Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1988); Susan Perry & Jim Dawson,
Nightmare: Women and the Dalkon Shield (1985); Susan Koniak, When Courts Re-
fuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to Their Will, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1075
(1993); Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text,
Subtext and Context, 41 J. Legal Educ. 29 (1991); Rhode, supra note 28, at 671-72;
Stuart Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983, § 6, at 30.
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ence, in which [a lawyer] is acting regularly in the moral arena, he is
alienated from his own moral feelings and attitudes and indeed
from his moral personality as a whole ....
The social costs of cutting off professional deliberation and action
from their sources in ordinary moral experience are even more
troubling. First, cut off from sound moral judgment, the lawyer's
ability to do his job well-to ... effectively advise his clients-is
likely to be seriously affected ....
[M]ost importantly, when professional action is estranged from
ordinary moral experience, the lawyer's sensitivity to the moral
costs in both ordinary and extraordinary situations tends to atrophy.
The ideal of neutrality permits, indeed requires, that the lawyer re-
gard his professional activities and their consequences from the
point of view of the uninvolved spectator.'
From most feminists' perspective, a preferable alternative would
break down the boundary between personal and professional ethics.
In essence, lawyers should accept direct moral accountability for their
professional acts. Attorneys' decisions should not depend on a reflex-
ive retreat into role; rather, individuals need to consider how the pur-
poses of that role can best be served within a particular context. In
some instances, those purposes call for deference to collectively deter-
mined legal and ethical rules. But such deference is justifiable only if
the rules themselves allow room to take account of all the morally
relevant factors in a given situation. So, for example, lawyers need to
evaluate the rationale for zealous partisanship not by reference to
some abstract model of an equal adversarial contest before a neutral
tribunal. Instead, they need to consider a realistic social and eco-
nomic landscape in which legal rights and resources may be unevenly
distributed, applicable laws may be unjustly skewed, and the vast ma-
jority of cases settle without ever reaching an impartial decision
maker.35
Oscar Wilde once reminded us that to be virtuous according to com-
mon conventions of behavior was not necessarily demanding. All it
required was a certain reflexive timidity and lack of imaginative
thought.36 To have moral character is something else again, and we
need to recognize the difference.
B. Lawyer-Client Relationships
Feminists' second line of challenge to conventional professional
structures involves their power dynamics. Lawyer-client relationships
34. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 63, 77-80 (1980).
35. See Luban, supra note 24; Postema, supra note 34, at 81-89; Rhode, supra note
24, at 617-26.
36. Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist, in The Artist as Critic 388 (Richard Ellmann
ed., 1969).
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frequently display patterns of dominance that ill-serve broader socie-
tal interests.
The problems often start in law school. Conventional classroom hi-
erarchies encourage extremes of both unreflective passivity and ag-
gressive competition. The structure of professorial control over the
content and evaluation of learning processes discourages independent
thought and encourages participation designed more to impress than
inform. All too often, the "search for knowledge" becomes a scram-
ble for status that undermines broader educational objectives. Au-
thoritarian structures and inadequate clinical and seminar
opportunities shortchange capacities that feminists believe should be
central to professional practice. Certain skills, such as collaboration,
empathetic listening, and ethically reflective decision making, call for
more interactive, egalitarian teaching formats.3 7
The patterns of dominance reinforced in legal education are repli-
cated in later workplace relationships, particularly those involving
subordinate groups. Authoritarian, paternalistic interactions between
lawyers and clients often obscure the needs that prompted profes-
sional consultation in the first instance. One study involving low-in-
come legal aid clients found that lawyers frequently interrupted and
attempted to control the topic in over ninety percent of their com-
ments.38 Yet professionals who constantly redirect the conversation of
those they purport to serve cannot effectively connect their skills to
real human needs. Nor can such strategies enable individuals to assess
and assert their own best interests. Empirical research consistently
indicates that clients who actively participate in decision-making do
better and have greater satisfaction than those who do not.39
The adverse effects of professional dominance are compounded by
other status inequalities such as class, race, ethnicity, and gender. The
most egregious cases of manipulating, circumventing, or simply over-
looking client objectives have involved subordinate groups. Women's
experiences in divorce proceedings offer a case in point. Legal aid
lawyers frequently have refused to handle such proceedings on the
37. Ervin Staub, Promoting Positive Behavior in Schools, in Other Educational Set-
tings, and in the Home, in Altruism and Helping Behavior: Social, Personality and
Developmental Perspectives 109, 126-27 (J. Phillippe Rushton & Richard M. Sorren-
tino eds., 1981); see also James Rest & Stephen J. Thoma, Educational Programs and
Interventions, in James R. Rest, Moral Development: Advances in Research and The-
ory 59, 59-78 (1986).
38. Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About
What Is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. Probs. 599,
604 (1979).
39. Douglas Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? 56-61 (1974); J.A.
Hall et al., Meta-Analysis of Correlates of Provider Behavior in Medical Encounters,
26 Med. Care 657, 665 (1988).
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ground that they present no pressing need or important law reform
issues even though clients give high priority to these cases.40
Even for middle and upper-income parties, a mismatch persists be-
tween what many women seek and what many attorneys supply. Em-
pirical studies reveal participants occupied with two different divorces:
lawyers with the financial and legal consequences of separation, and
clients with the social and emotional ones.4' Attorneys receive little
training in how to respond to individuals in stress, and often end up
talking past the concerns that are most central to the parties. The
problem is apparent in many dialogues recorded in recent research on
divorce practice. For example:
Client: There was harassment and verbal degradation. No interest
at all in my furthering my education. None whatsoever. Sexual har-
assment. If there was ever any time when I did not want or need
sex, I was subject to, you know, these long verbal whiplashings.
Then the Bible would be put out on the counter with passages un-
derlined as to what a poor wife I was. Just constant harassment
from him.
Lawyer: Mmn uh.
Client: [I] could lock myself in the bathroom and he would break
in. And I was just to listen, whether I wanted to or not .... There
was no escaping him, short of getting in a car and driving away. But
then he would stand outside in the driveway and yell, anyhow. The
man was not well.
Lawyer: Okay. Now how about any courses you took?4 2
Clients are like performers playing before bored, but dutiful legal
audiences; lawyers do not "interrupt the aria, but [they do not] ap-
plaud much either for fear of an encore."43 As a result, the process
becomes for many clients "at best a distraction and at worst an addi-
tional trauma."'  While lawyers cannot substitute for trained ther-
apists, neither can they function effectively as legal advisors without
adequate skills in empathetic listening.
Attorneys accustomed to dominating clients' decision-making for
"their own good" may too readily replicate those patterns when it
40. Samuel Brakel, Judicare 71 (1974) (pointing out that representation in divorce
is the most frequently requested service under voucher plans); National Center on
Women and Family Law, Challenges Facing Legal Services in the 1990s 4 n.6 (1988)
(noting that during the 1980s, half of sampled legal service programs eliminated rep-
resentation in divorce and custody issues). For discussion of longstanding restrictions
on representation for family cases, see Richard Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid
Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 474, 608 (1985); Silverstein, Eligibil-
ity for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. Urb. L. 549, 571-81 (1967).
41. Cf Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies
of Motive in Lawyer-Client Interaction, 22 L. & Soc'y Rev. 737, 742 (1988).
42. Id at 744-55.
43. Id. at 750.
44. Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda
of Legal Education, 41 J. Legal Educ. 43, 53 (1991).
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serves practitioners' own interests. One of the most obvious examples
involves lawyer-client sexual relationships. Although the extent of the
practice is difficult to measure, almost a third of surveyed attorneys
are aware of one or more such relationships.45 Research involving a
variety of professions finds that such sexual intimacy puts clients at
substantial risk.46 These relationships are likely to compromise in-
dependent judgment by both parties. Attorneys who want to prolong
or terminate sexual intimacy may skew their legal advice accordingly.
And clients who are involved in such relationships do not always feel
able to challenge the quality of assistance provided, the strategies pro-
posed, or the fees requested.47 Nor is intimacy wholly consensual if
parties fear that rebuffing their lawyer would adversely affect their
legal representation or impose the expense and delay of hiring other
counsel.48
Although almost three-quarters of surveyed lawyers acknowledge
that sexual involvement with clients causes problems, no state imposes
a categorical prohibition, and only a few address the issue explicitly.4 9
Many practitioners oppose bar regulation on the ground that it would
interfere with lawyers' privacy and associational rights, create "op-
pressive bureaucracies," discourage relationships that promote "fer-
vent[ ]" advocacy, and force single lawyers to "revert to celibacy."5
45. J.L. Bernard et al., Dangerous Liaisons Survey: Most Disapprove of Lawyer-
Client Sex, 78 A.B.A. J. 82, 82 (1992).
46. Jacqueline Bouhoutsos et al., Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists and
Patients, 14 Prof. Psychol. Res. & Prac. 185, 194-95 (1983) (finding that 90% of pa-
tients reported adverse effects); Shirley Feldman-Summers & Gwendolyn Jones, Psy-
chological Impacts of Sexual Contact Between Therapists or Other Health Care
Practitioners and Their Clients, 52 J. Consulting Clinical Psychol. 1054, 1060 (1984);
see also John M. O'Connell, Note, Attorney-Client Sex, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 887, 920
n.175 (1992); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer-Client Sex Relations are Taboo, Nat'l
L.J., Apr. 15, 1991, at 13.
47. See sources cited supra note 46; Howard W. Brill, Sex and the Client: Ten
Reasons to Say "No!", 33 Santa Clara L. Rev. 651 (1993); see also Caroline Forell,
Lawyers, Clients and Sex: Breaking Silence on the Ethical and Liability Issues, 22
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 611, 613 (1992).
48. See sources cited supra notes 46-47.
49. Bernard et al., supra note 45, at 82. In 1991, California became the first state
to pass a general rule on the subject. That rule prohibits attorneys from demanding or
requiring sexual relationships with clients, from employing coercion or undue influ-
ence in entering into sexual relationships, and from continuing representation if a
relationship causes incompetent performance. California Rules of Professional Con-
duct Rule 3-120 (1988); see also Section 6106 of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code (1992). Other bar associations have considered categorical prohibitions
on attorney-client sex (e.g., Oregon) or on sexual relationships that involve duress,
intimidation, undue influence, or consent impaired by emotional or financial depen-
dence or other relevant factors (e.g., Chicago). William T. Barker & C. Harker
Rhodes, Jr., Draconian Sex Rules Premature, Nat'l L.J., June 29, 1992, at 17-18.
50. David Margolick, At the Bar: Are Lawyers Violating Professional Ethics When
They Have Sexual Affairs with Their Clients?, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1988, at B5 (quoting
divorce attorney Raoul Felder); see also Bernard et al., supra note 45, at 83; Forell,
supra note 47, at 635; Yael Levy, Attorneys, Clients and Sex: Conflicting Interests in
the California Rule, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 649, 662-69 (1992).
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A widespread view is that attorneys "should be able to sort out their
sexual activities without any advice from the state bar."5'
On some level, most feminists would agree. Attorneys should. But
as a review of recently reported cases makes clear, too many lawyers
need better advice from somewhere, and they aren't getting it from
courts or disciplinary authorities.5" Sanctions and reporting structures
are far from adequate. 3 More bright line rules are necessary, prefera-
bly ones prohibiting such involvement. Other professions have imple-
mented such prohibitions without the dire consequences that
opponents have invoked.:4 At the very least, if a client complains, the
burden should fall on the attorney to prove that the sexual relation-
ship was consensual and that professional services were not adversely
affected 55
51. Joanne Pitulla, Unfair Advantage: When Lawyers Have Sex with Clients Are
They Violating Professional Ethics? More and More, the Answer Is Yes., A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1992, at 76 (quoting Joseph Hurley).
52. Professor John Elson of Northwestern University Law School, who has liti-
gated some cases involving attorney-client sex, has "found the legal system to be not
only unresponsive, but actively hostile to women who complained of having been co-
erced by a divorce lawyer into sexual relations .... Judges trivialized and even ridi-
culed the harm the women suffered and took great pains to seal their cases in order to
protect the accused lawyer from public embarrassment." Id. at 80; see also sources
cited supra note 47 and infra note 53.
53. See Linda Mabus Johnson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Lawyer-Client Sexual
Contact: State Bars Polled, Nat'l LJ., June 15, 1992, at 26 (noting that of 47 respond-
ing bars, about a third kept no statistics on sexual conduct, and over half had fewer
than five complaints over the past two years). For examples of inadequate sanctions,
see Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 105 (Ill. 1990) (holding that sexual
relationships did not violate fiduciary obligations even though the client's consent was
not knowledgeable or voluntary); Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990) (impos-
ing two-year suspension on lawyer who had sex with divorce client while knowing she
was under psychiatric care and who subsequently terminated their affair); United
States v. Babbitt, 26 MJ. 157, 159 (C.M.A. 1988) (rejecting defendant's claim that she
was denied effective assistance of counsel because she was involved in a sexual rela-
tionship with her defense attorney; a review of the record indicated that the attorney
was "if anything, spurred on" by the relationship (quoting lower court, 22 MJ. 672,
677-78 (1986))); see also Doe v. Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353, 355 (N.D. Il. 1991), aff'd, 958
F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1992) (dismissing RICO complaint against same lawyer in-
volved in Suppressed v. Suppressed who threatened client with reprisals from "very
Italian friends" if she did not pay her bill and suggested that she work off the charges
through sexual relations). Under the court's analysis in Doe, because the client com-
plied and paid her bills with sex, she suffered no federally cognizable economic loss.
Id.
54. For discussion of prohibitions on sexual involvement between patients and
mental health practitioners, see Johnson & Sutherland, supra note 53, at 26; Lawrence
Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits, 1 Geo. . Legal Ethics
585, 615-16 (1988).
55. For a description of the rules, see supra note 49. The ABA advises attorneys
to avoid sexual relationships with clients and indicates that if such relationships occur,
lawyers should bear a heavy burden to demonstrate that their representation was not
adversely affected. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 364 (1992).
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C. Professional Services
Lawyer-client conflicts of interest also arise in the delivery of legal
services. American legal norms encourage unduly expensive assist-
ance for individuals who can afford it and tolerate inadequate repre-
sentation for those who cannot. The situation persists in part because
the bar's financial interest lies more in perpetuating the first problem
than in addressing the second. That is not to imply that attorneys are
driven only by economic concerns; overbilling and litigiousness are fu-
eled by a complex set of structural, psychological, and financial pres-
sures. All professionals have a natural desire to believe in their own
effectiveness and to leave no stone unturned, especially if they can
charge by the stone.5 6 By contrast, where the costs of effective repre-
sentation exceed what clients or legal service programs can subsidize,
the tendency is to revise expectations for assistance in accordance with
financial realities. 7
Feminist approaches offer no simple solutions to these problems.
But a commitment to relational values and the concerns of
subordinate groups makes addressing such issues a more central prior-
ity. As the following discussion suggests, a feminist understanding of
professional responsibilities implies a fundamental redistribution of
professional services.
One obvious step toward that end involves changing lawyers' rela-
tionships with providers of similar services. Traditionally, the legal
profession has asserted inherent authority to define the practice of
law, to limit that practice to lawyers, and thus to determine the scope
of its own monopoly. Repeatedly, bar leaders have insisted that it is
consumers, not attorneys, who suffer from unqualified lay assistance,
and that the "fight to stop it is the public's fight."'5 8 If so, the public
has been curiously unsupportive of the war effort. On the relatively
few occasions when consumers' opinions have been solicited, they
have endorsed greater access to legal services provided by non-
lawyers. 59
56. Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine 257-58 (1970); Rhode, supra note 24, at
635; Rhode, supra note 28, at 679.
57. Thus, overburdened and underpaid criminal defense lawyers often will "cool a
client out" and influence decisions in favor of a quick guilty plea rather than extended
proceedings. Albert Alshuler, Personal Failure, Institutional Failure and the Sixth
Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change, 149, 150 (1986); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979, 1988 (1992).
58. ABA, National Conference on the Unauthorized Practice of Law 101 (1962)
(remarks of former ABA President John C. Satterfield, quoting Iowa Supreme
Court). For contemporary variations on this theme, see Thomas R. Curtin, Nonlawy-
ers Are Not the Answer, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at 28; sources cited in Deborah L.
Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209,
220-21, 233 (1990).
59. In one survey, over 82% of the respondents agreed that "many things that
lawyers handle-for example, tax matters or estate planning.., can be done as well
and less expensively by nonlawyers;" Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the
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Such services could help address this nation's vast array of unmet
legal needs, particularly those concentrated among women and other
subordinate groups. Research focusing on low-income populations
finds no services available for fifty to eighty percent of their reported
needs." Middle income consumers also lack affordable services for
matters that carry special importance for women, such as those con-
cerning divorce and domestic violence.61 Many of these unmet needs
involve relatively routine, specialized services for which professional
education is neither necessary nor sufficient. Graduating from law
schools and passing bar exams provides no assurance of expertise in
matters such as uncontested divorces, landlord-tenant disputes, bank-
ruptcy filings, welfare claims, or protective orders against domestic vi-
olence. In many jurisdictions here and abroad, non-lawyers
frequently provide services in these areas with no apparent adverse
effects.6
2
Relaxation of the professional monopoly over legal assistance not
only might promote more competitive services, but also could en-
courage reforms that would decrease the need for such services in the
first instance. Reducing lawyers' financial stakes in certain legal pro-
ceedings could reduce the obstacles to procedural simplification and
innovation. Such initiatives might include citizen advice bureaus,
court-affiliated ombudspersons, self-help services, no-fault insurance
programs, and various alternative dispute resolution procedures such
as mediation and arbitration. These approaches have the potential to
serve values that are central to feminist agendas. Such initiatives can
decrease the costs and acrimony associated with traditional adver-
sarial processes, explore root causes of disputes as well as their legal
Public: The Final Report of a National Survey 231 (1977). For other examples, see
Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empir-
ical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1981).
60. See Barbara A. Curran, Report: 1989 Survey of the Public's Use of Legal
Services (1989); Illinois Legal Needs Study 2 (Chicago: Chicago Bar Association.
Oct. 6, 1989); The Spangenberg Group, National Survey of the Civil Legal Needs of
the Poor 3, 18 (1989); see also ABA Consortium on Legal Services and the Public,
Legal Needs and Civil Justice (1994) [hereinafter ABA Consortium] (noting that
three-quarters of the legal needs of low-income households and nearly two-thirds of
the needs of moderate-income households were not taken to the civil justice system,
and over half of the low-income households and over a third of the moderate income
households were dissatisfied with the outcome of their action or inaction).
61. For domestic violence, see Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Do-
mestic Violence, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1498, 1525-26 (1993). For other family cases, see
Gender Bias Study Committee, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Report of the Gen-
der Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court 21 (1989) [hereinafter Gender Bias
Study]; National Center on Women and Family Law, supra note 40, at 4 n.6.
62. See John H. Merryman & David S. Clark, Comparative Law: Western Euro-
pean and Latin American Legal Systems 456-57 (1978); Michael Zander, Legal Serv-
ices for the Community 329-35 (1978); Rhode, supra note 58, at 215; Rhode, supra
note 59, at 85-90.
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symptoms, and draw on skills of non-legal experts with experience in
facilitating relationships.
This is not to suggest that all forms of delegalization or alternative
dispute resolution are socially desirable. Rather, as feminists have
often emphasized, what is needed is contextual analysis. In some cir-
cumstances, informal mediation between parties with unequal bar-
gaining power can reinforce inequality and encourage negotiation of
rights that should be nonnegotiable. Divorcing wives may trade prop-
erty rights to avoid custody fights or battered spouses may agree to
stop "nagging" in exchange for their partners' promises to refrain
from assaults.63 Informal processes oriented toward private settle-
ments may also undervalue society's interest in having publicly ac-
countable officials apply collectively determined standards.' 4 How
best to structure the delivery of professional services cannot be re-
solved in the abstract. Rather, that question requires a more particu-
larized analysis of the social context and power relationships from
which a given legal need arises.
Feminists also seek a fundamental restructuring of the priorities un-
derlying judicial administration and subsidized legal services. The rea-
son was well illustrated in testimony before the California Gender
Bias Commission. As one prominent state judge noted, in general
civil court she had recently spent ten days presiding over a jury trial
involving a $100,000 dispute between two companies. In family court,
she had a docket of thirty to forty custody and child abuse cases per
day, involving an average of two to three children per case. In ten
days, she was expected to address the needs of 1000 children.65 Such
disparities are by no means unique to California.66 Nor are resource
problems confined to the judicial system. Legal aid and court-con-
nected services are shockingly underfunded for family-related needs.67
Although the shape of necessary reforms is beyond the scope of this
Article, the general direction of feminist concern is clear. Our society
must spend more, and spend more wisely, in areas such as domestic
violence, child support enforcement, custody disputes, and child abuse
and neglect. If our nation is truly committed to "family values," we
63. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale
L.J. 1545, 1549-51, 1555-96,1605-07 (1991); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 Harv. Wo-
men's L.J. 57, 75 (1984).
64. Owen H. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984).
65. How Gender Bias Creeps Into Courts, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1990, at B6.
66. See Lois G. Forer, Money & Justice: Who Owns the Courts 14-29 (1984); Har-
riet Chiang, Sexism Pervades State's Courts, Committee Says Study Finds Discrimina-
tion at All Levels, Suggests New Rules for Lawyers, Judges, S.F. Chron., Mar. 4, 1990,
at 1.
67. ABA Consortium, supra note 60; Gender Bias Study, supra note 61, at 21;
National Center on Women and Family Law, supra note 40, at 4.
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need a better match between our legal structures and resource
priorities.
III. COLLEGIAL RELATIONS AND WORKPLACE STRUCTURES:
GENDER BIAS AND GENDER RoLEs
A final area of feminist concern, and the one that has attracted
greatest bar attention, involves gender bias in the professional work-
place. Over the last decade, that problem has come under increasing
scrutiny, not because it has become more acute, but rather because its
dimensions have grown more visible and because women have gained
sufficient leverage to get the issue onto the bar's agenda.
Both developments are apparent in the work of gender bias com-
missions. During the 1980s and early 1990s, one federal circuit and
about two thirds of state judiciaries established such commissions to
consider gender bias in the courts. About a third formed analogous
groups to consider racial or ethnic bias, and a few states gave one task
force jurisdiction over both issues." In addition, the American Bar
Association and some national, state, and local bar organizations es-
tablished commissions on the status of women and on racial and eth-
nic minorities in the legal profession.69 These initiatives reflect and
reinforce a growing perception within the bar about the extent of bias
and the need for further strategies to address it. Although diagnoses
of the problem vary, certain common themes emerge.
As a definitional matter, most task forces have interpreted bias to
include stereotypes or misconceptions about the nature, roles, and life
circumstances of men and women, as well as the devaluation of wo-
men and tasks traditionally perceived as "women's work."70 In gen-
eral, these bias studies have focused on the judicial system and the
professional workplace. They have not given significant consideration
to other law-related contexts, such as legal education, and they have
varied considerably in their attention to substantive doctrine. This
Article similarly restricts its focus. Emphasis centers on professional
workplaces, although effective strategies for change obviously must
include other institutional settings.
Taken as a whole, this recent work on bias has made major contri-
butions in both substantive and methodological terms. It has identi-
fied the nature of the problem and has assessed appropriate responses
68. Kathleen L. Soil, Gender Bias Task Forces: Have They Fulfilled Their Mandate
and Recommendations for Change, 2 Rev. Law & Women's Studies 633, 634, 638
(1993) (noting that as of May 1993, 35 states, the District of Columbia, and two fed-
eral judicial circuits had established gender bias task forces, and that 26 had published
reports).
69. Examples include the National Consortium on Race and Ethnic Bias in the
Courts, the ABA Commission on Women in the Profession, and the ABA Task Force
on Minorities in the Legal Profession.
70. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for Judi-
cial Reform, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 237, 238-39 (1989).
19941
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
through a process responsive to women's experiences. Rather than
simply compiling existing research on female underrepresentation and
unequal treatment, state bias commissions generally have insisted on
providing direct opportunities to be heard. The result has been an
accumulation of stories as well as statistics, striking for both their
"endless variety and monotonous similarity."' 71 Patterns that male
professionals have long denied, dismissed, or discounted have ac-
quired new credibility, and the gender-related effects of ostensibly
gender-neutral practices have become more difficult to ignore.
The discussion that follows attempts to convey the experiential
qualities of this work, not simply because they enliven the account,
but also because they enrich the analysis. Standard academic fare
often excludes relevant material that might appear too anecdotal. But
as skeptics have observed in other contexts, the plural of anecdote is
data. And in this context, what has reportedly converted some of the
previously unconverted are the narratives about the personal costs of
professional devaluation.72 As the social science consultant to one
task force notes:
Statistical data on employment patterns, case outcomes, and other
"objective" phenomena may satisfy those who require concrete evi-
dence of differential treatment [and assurances]... that individuals'
testimonials about their experiences are not aberrational. But sta-
tistical analytic results, reported coldly and impersonally... give lit-
tle sense of the pain and difficulties associated with less powerful
groups' struggles for equality. Feelings of exclusion and disadvan-
tage are as much a part of the objective reality of gender bias, as are
unequal treatment in hiring and promotion and judicial
decisionmaking. 73
Viewed not as substitutes but as supplements to other approaches,
women's stories are part of the story that needs to be told.
A. Professional Opportunities
Women, particularly women of color, are significantly over-
represented in the least prestigious and least remunerative areas of
practice and significantly underrepresented among the most elite posi-
tions. For example, women account for close to forty-five percent of
new entrants to the profession, and over twenty percent of all lawyers,
71. The phrase comes from Gayle Rubin's description of sex-based subordination
across varied cultural settings. Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the
"Political Economy" of Sex, in Toward an Anthropology of Women 157, 160 (Rayna
R. Reiter ed., 1975).
72. See sources cited supra note 71 and infra notes 113, 126, 130-31.
73. Deborah R. Hensler, Studying Gender Bias in the Courts: Stories and Statis-
tics, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 2187, 2187 (1993); see also Penelope Eileen Bryan, Toward
Deconstructing the Deconstruction of Law and Lawyers, 71 Deny. U. L. Rev. 161, 164
n.19 (1993); Judith Resnik, Ambivalence: The Resiliency of Legal Culture in the
United States, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1525, 1534-35 (1993).
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but only about eleven percent of the partners in the nation's 250 larg-
est firms, eight percent of the federal bench, sixteen percent of full
professors in law schools, and seven percent of law school deans.74
Female lawyers also earn substantially less and express more dissatis-
faction with practice than male lawyers.75 Although data are disturb-
ingly hard to come by, these disparities are still greater for women of
color.7 6
What accounts for such gender differences is a matter of dispute.
Many observers believe that factors other than discrimination explain
most differences. One common view is that current gender inequali-
ties reflect women's historic underrepresentation in the profession.
With recent changes in legal norms and cultural attitudes, any sex-
biased disparity naturally will erode. As one (male) attorney put it in
a Ninth Circuit study, "I really don't think there is any substantial
gender bias. If there is, then in a few years it will be gone when the
new generation takes over. So relax, and let time take care of the
problem. 77
74. For lawyers, see Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Dem-
ographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 Case W. Res. L
Rev. 345 (1994); Claudia MacLachlan & Rita Henley Jensen, Progress Glacial for
Women, Minorities, Nat'l LJ., Jan. 27, 1992, at 1. For judges, see Miriam Goldman
Cedarbaum, Women on the Federal Bench, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 39, 42 (1993) (explaining
that of approximately 801 federal district judges, there are 62 women; of approxi-
mately 250 court of appeals and supreme court judges, 22 are women); Resnik, supra
note 73, at 1535 n.51 (noting that in the early 1990s, 60 of 94 federal district courts had
no life tenured judges who were women). For law professors, see Richard A. White,
Association of American Law Schools Statistical Report on Full 'ime Law School
Faculty tbl. 1 (1994) (indicating that women constitute 15.8% of full professors, 39.6%
of associate professors and 50.6% of assistant professors). For law school deans, see
Marilyn J. Berger & Kari A. Robinson, Women's Ghetto Within the Legal Profession,
8 Wis. Women's L.J 71, 88, 95 (1992-93). See also Deborah J. Merritt et al., Family,
Place, and Career: The Gender Paradox in Law School Hiring, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 395.
75. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Lawyers Give Thumbs Up, Nat'l L.I., May 28, 1990, at
52; see also ABA Young Lawyers Division, 7The State of the Legal Profession 1990 54,
63-64 (1991); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 218, 226; Stacy Caplow & Shira
Scheindlin, "Portrait of a Lady": The Woman Lawyer in the 1980s, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L
Rev. 391, 408, 418 (1990); Deborah K. Holmes, Structural Causes of Dissatisfaction
Among Large-Firm Attorneys: A Feminist Perspective, 12 Women's Rts. L Rep. 9,20-
23 (1990).
76. See ABA Task Force on Minorities and the Justice System, Achieving Justice
in a Diverse America: Report of the ABA Task Force on Minorities and the Justice
System (1992); White, supra note 74, at tbl. 1 (showing that women of color account
for 1.6% of full professors at law schools supplying information). Statistics on the
legal profession typically do not include a separate category for women of color. See
sources cited supra note 74. However, even without gender breakdowns, the classifi-
cations by race and ethnicity support the general statement in the text. See MacLach-
lan & Jensen, supra note 74, at 1 (noting that minorities account for 2.4% of large firm
partners); see also 1 Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities
(1991).
77. The Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force: Discus-
sion Draft 60 (1992) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
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A related claim, reinforced by classic economic theories, maintains
that a well functioning market will eliminate discriminatory patterns.
According to these theories, employers who do not indulge arbitrary
preferences will have a competitive advantage. As Richard Epstein
argues, "constraints of reputation and survival are powerful checks
against any firmwide effort to engage in sex discrimination.""8
In practice, however, recent research makes clear that gender bias
in attitudes and occupational structures can be highly resistant to
change, and that professional employment markets are far from per-
fectly competitive. Within the bar, studies that have controlled for age
do not find substantially greater sensitivity to bias among younger
male attorneys than their older colleagues. 79 Status and income dis-
parities between women and men cannot be explained by length of
time in legal practice or other objectively quantifiable factors. In law,
as in other elite professions, female members advance less far and less
quickly than male colleagues with comparable qualifications.80 For
example, the ABA's recent survey found that of some 3,000 young
lawyers with similar backgrounds, men were twice as likely to have
attained partnership status.81
1. Individual Choice and Institutional Constraints
To explain these disparities, some researchers and many practition-
ers place primary importance on men's and women's different choices.
According to human capital theories, women seek to reconcile com-
peting job and family demands by making a lower investment in their
professions. Leading economists argue that the "conflicts between ca-
reer and family ... are stronger for women than for men .... [An
78. Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Dis-
crimination Laws 390-91 (1992); see also Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimi-
nation (2d ed. 1971).
79. The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Report of the Ninth Circuit
Gender Bias Task Force 18-20 (1993).
80. For lawyers, see ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, Report to the
House of Delegates (1988). See also Spurr, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profes-
sion: A Study of Promotion, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 406, 413 (1990); ABA Young
Lawyers Division, supra note 75, at 63; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at D18;
Holmes, supra note 75, at 19. For other professions, see Henry J. Aaron & Cameran
M. Lougy, The Comparable Worth Controversy 12-13 (1986); U.S. Dep't of Labor, A
Report on the Glass Ceiling Initiative 4-5 (1991); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Prob-
lem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 Yale L.J. 1731, 1758
(1991) (sources cited therein).
81. ABA Young Lawyers Division, supra note 75, at 63 (finding 18% of women as
compared with 45% of men were partners); see also Special Committee on Gender in
the District of Columbia United States Court of Appeals, Preliminary Report to the
Task Force of the District of Columbia Circuit on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias (May
1994) [hereinafter Special Committee on Gender] (finding that of surveyed lawyers
graduating after 1979, 42% of men, but only 28% of women were partners); Saundra
Torry, Female Lawyers Face Sexism, Study Finds: Most Problems Are in Pretrial
Work, Women Say, Wash. Post, May 28, 1994, at B1.
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average woman] feel[s] a stronger desire for children than do men and
a greater concern for their welfare after they are born.''s2 Richard
Epstein similarly maintains that the "extensive differences in occupa-
tional patterns for men and women ... [are attributable] not to dis-
crimination by employers but to the different preference structures of
men and women."'
Feminists respond to these claims on several levels. As a threshold
matter, they generally agree that women experience greater difficul-
ties than men in reconciling work and family obligations. Female pro-
fessionals continue to assume the vast majority of responsibilities in
the home and to pay a price in the world outside it.' Most feminists,
however, do not view this gender difference solely as a function of
natural preferences. Rather, these commentators emphasize that sex-
based socialization patterns and employment cultures condition wo-
men to form lower aspirations for vocational achievement and to as-
sume a greater share of family responsibilities.'
Moreover, as considerable feminist research makes clear, women's
career sacrifices are attributable to the choices not simply of individ-
ual women but also of employer and societal decisionmakers. Inade-
quacies in policies involving parental leave, part-time work, child care,
and related issues contribute greatly to professionals' problems in ac-
commodating work and family commitments."
My own exposure to the problem first occurred almost two decades
ago when I was interviewing for a summer job. From one distin-
guished Chicago litigator I learned that there was "no woman prob-
lem" at his firm. His female partner (one out of about forty)
reportedly had no difficulties reconciling her personal and profes-
sional life. Why, just last fall she had given birth to her first child. It
happened on a Friday and she was back at the office the folloing
Monday.
The novelty of these "faster than a speeding bullet" maternity
leaves is wearing thin, but variations on the theme continue to de-
velop. Thus far, the record for reconciling personal and professional
82. Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality 4 (1988); see also
Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical Perspective and Empirical Analysis,
with Special Reference to Education 178-80 (2d ed. 1975).
83. Epstein, supra note 78, at 77 n.16.
84. According to most estimates, employed wives spend about twice as much time
on household tasks as employed husbands. See Arlie Hochschild & Anne Machung,
The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home 266 (1989); Alison
L. Cowan, Poll Finds Women's Gains Have Taken a Personal Toll, N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 1989, at Al.
85. See, eg., sources cited in Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender 165-67
(1989); Rhode, supra note 80, at 1731, 1758, 1768-70.
86. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and The Transformation of Work-
place Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1220-23 (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture
Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 621, 647-48, 659
(1994); see also infra notes 87-91, 101 and accompanying text.
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rhythms may go to the woman who finished interrogatories while tim-
ing her contractions during labor. If you're billing at six minute inter-
vals, why waste a moment?
Although well over two-thirds of legal employers now have formal
maternity policies, their adequacy varies.87 Many fall far short of what
child development experts generally recommend.88 Moreover, most
workplaces have yet to develop satisfactory part-time arrangements.
In the ABA's recent national survey, only eight percent of lawyers in
private practice were working a reduced schedule, and sixty percent of
practitioners believed that taking part-time status would limit their
advancement.8 9
Workplace cultures that only grudgingly accommodate mothers' ob-
ligations are still less tolerant of fathers'. About two-thirds of firm
policies do not provide paid paternity leave. 90 National surveys find
that even in organizations offering such leaves, less than two percent
of eligible fathers take them, and those that do generally are absent
for only a brief period.91 Peer pressures, socialization patterns, and
personal convenience all war against egalitarian roles. Thus, a wide
gap persists between many men's rhetorical commitments and daily
practices. Women lawyers often have husbands who perceive their
own professional aspirations and obligations as fixed, but those of
their wives as negotiable. As a male attorney in one study of dual
career couples put it, "[i]t's not a question of what I want." g After
all, "a demanding practice is a demanding practice." 93
Such attitudes, which deny choice even as it is exercised, contribute
to women's problems in coping with their own demanding practices.
Increasing competitiveness and commercialization have driven billa-
ble hour requirements to unprecedented levels. Until the last few de-
cades, the conventional wisdom was that "lawyers could not
reasonably expect to charge for more than 1200 to 1500 hours per
87. ABA Young Lawyers Division, supra note 75, at 28.
88. See Recommendations of the Yale Bush Center Advisory Committee on Infant
Care Leave, in The Parental Leave Crisis: Toward a National Policy 343 (Edward F.
Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 1988).
89. ABA Young Lawyers Division, supra note 75, at 25. Many female attorneys at
large firms believe that taking part-time status is "career suicide." Emily Couric, Wo-
men in the Large Firms: A High Price of Admission, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 11, 1989, at S2,
S10.
90. ABA Young Lawyers Division, supra note 75, at 29.
91. Shari Rudavsky, New Fathers Reluctant to Take Time Out, Wash. Post, July 7,
1992, at A3 (surveying 1000 of the nation's largest companies and finding that 31%
offered some form of paternity leave, but only about 1% of eligible employees took
it); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev.
1163, 1184 n.115 (1988); Rhode, supra note 80, at 1772 n.202.
92. Hochschild & Machung, supra note 84, at 113 (1989) (quoting a male attorney
whose wife also worked).
93. Id.
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year."'94 Recent surveys find that almost half of private practitioners
bill over 2000.95 "What has not changed is the number of hours in a
day. "96
For women, this puritan ethic gone amok, coupled with the inade-
quacy of part-time arrangements, imposes substantial costs. Other ev-
idence similarly indicates that in promotion and compensation
decisions, billable hours function as a proxy for other harder to mea-
sure characteristics, such as dependability and commitment. 97 One re-
sult is that most attorneys report working longer schedules than they
would like.98 The inadequacy of time for personal and family needs is,
in turn, a leading cause of lawyers' exceptionally high rates of job dis-
satisfaction, stress, and related problems such as depression and sub-
stance abuse.99
2. Structural Responses
These are obviously not just "women's issues," although women
have a special stake in finding more effective responses. As female
attorneys constitute an increasing part of the profession, it becomes
increasingly costly to discount their needs and devalue their talents.
That is not to ignore the difficult issues involved in designing equita-
ble part-time policies. Conflicting values inevitably arise in allocating
overhead costs, distributing onerous work assignments, and determin-
ing eligibility. Among the most controversial questions is whether
94. Rhode, supra note 28, at 711; see also James Robertson, The Beginning of tie
End of the Billable Hour? Wash. Law., July-Aug. 1991, at 7.
95. ABA Young Lawyers Division, supra note 75, at 22; Nancy D. Holt, Are
Longer Hours Here to Stay: Quality Time Losing Out, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 62, 64.
96. Rhode, supra note 28, at 711.
97. Renee M. Landers et al., Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determi-
nation of Work Hours 23 (Dec. 14, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
authors).
98. ABA Young Lawyers Division, supra note 75, at 64 (reporting that 61% of
women and 55% of men don't have sufficient time for themselves); Holmes, supra
note 75, at 14; Women in the Law Survey: Analyzing Job Dissatisfaction, Cal. Law.,
Jan. 1990, at 84 [hereinafter Women in the Law Survey] (in explaining sources of dis-
satisfaction, 93% of women cited too many hours and 92% cited difficulties balancing
personal and professional lives).
99. For research on dissatisfaction and stress, see ABA Young Lawyers Division,
supra note 75, at 54 (reporting that 41% of women and 28% of men in private prac-
tice are dissatisfied); Women in the Law Survey, supra note 98, at 84; Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 86, at 623; Andrew Herrmann, Depressing News for Lawyers,
Chi. Sun Tunes, Sept. 13, 1991, at 1 (reporting survey findings that lawyers top the list
of professionals likely to suffer major depression); Shelly Phillips, Lawyers Who Want
Out Nearly Half Say They Would Change Jobs If They Felt There Was a Reasonable
Alternative, A National Survey Finds, Phila. Inquirer, June 8, 1993, at Fl; Benjamin
Sells, Counsel on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, S.F. Daily J., May 25, 1994, at
3A. For estimates suggesting that the percentage of lawyers with substance abuse
problems is twice the national average, see Anne Fahy Morris, Justifiable Paranoia
Afflicts Lawyers, Psychologist Says, L.A. Times, May 1, 1994, at A27; Substance Abuse
in the Workplace, Mich. Law. Wkly., May 4, 1992, at 23.
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anyone should be able to take part-time status for any period of time.
If not, what reasons should be acceptable, what limitations should be
applicable, and who should decide? In general, the narrower the pol-
icy, the more resentment and stigma it causes; the broader the policy,
the more employer costs it imposes.1 °
How best to respond to these concerns varies across practice con-
texts. Much may depend on the size and profit margins of the institu-
tion and the predictability of work in part-time employees' areas of
specialization. What feminism demands is not a generic solution, but
a genuine commitment to eliminating structural biases and to further-
ing relational values. However other issues are resolved, accommo-
dating family obligations should be a central priority. That priority
rests in part on the social importance of caretaking, in part on the
unfairness of restricting caregivers' career opportunities because of
temporary constraints, and in part on the value to employing institu-
tions of accommodating family needs.
In the long run, failure to develop adequate part-time and parental
leave policies proves expensive to all concerned. It cannot help but
increase turnover, impair recruiting, compromise job performance,
and jeopardize the well-being of caretakers as well as their families. 0 1
Restructuring both work and domestic roles is essential to achieving
equal opportunity in fact as well as theory. Gender hierarchies will
persist until concerns about the quality of life become more central
professional priorities, and more men begin to see equality for women
in personal as well as political terms.
B. Gender Stereotypes and Unconscious Bias
1. Defining the Problem
The insensitivity to work/family conflicts is symptomatic of broader
patterns of gender bias within the legal profession. Virtually every bar
commission and serious scholar in the field has documented persistent
forms of discrimination, as well as substantial disparities in men's and
women's perceptions of such behavior. In nearly all studies, between
two-thirds and three-fourths of the women surveyed indicate that they
have experienced some form of discrimination or bias, while only one-
fourth to one-third of the men report observing such conduct.'02 As
100. See ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, Lawyers and Balanced Lives:
A Guide to Drafting and Implementing Workplace Policies for Lawyers pt. 2, § 2, at 1
(1990); Gary W. Loveman, The Case of the Part-Time Partner, in Reach for the Top
113-28 (1994); Shiela Nielsen, The Balancing Act: Practical Suggestions for Part-Time
Attorneys, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 369 (1990).
101. ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, supra note 100, pt. 2, § 1, at 22;
Nielsen, supra note 100, at 373-74; Katrina M. Dewey, A New Reality Sets In, Cal.
Law Bus., May 16, 1994, at 2024; Joan H. Stern, Female Talent at Law Firms, Nat'l L.J.,
Mar. 18, 1991, at 15.
102. Ann J. Gellis, Great Expectations: Women in the Legal Profession, A Com-
mentary on State Studies, 66 Ind. L.J. 941, 971 (1991); see also Judicial Council Advi-
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one male lawyer responding to the Ninth Circuit Survey put it, "I have
never witnessed nor heard of a single incident of gender bias. '' 03
Moreover, men who do perceive such bias often discount its signifi-
cance. As a Texas practitioner noted, "[o]f all the problems we have
as lawyers, gender discrimination is low on the list of important
ones."'" Other men's responses to bias studies were less restrained:
"'a complete waste of time and money!'; 'a pile of garbage'; 'much
ado about nothing.' ,,o
These differing perceptions in part reflect men's privileged status
and the resiliency of unconscious bias. A major problem involves lin-
gering skepticism about female competence, a problem compounded
for women of color. Although such doubts are rarely aired in mixed
company, their influence is still apparent in studies of unconscious
bias. So, for example, surveys involving various professions find that
the same work or the same resume is rated lower if it is attributed to a
woman rather than a man.' °6 Female lawyers, particularly racial and
ethnic minorities, frequently report that they lack the same presump-
tion of competence that their white male colleagues enjoy.107 The
persistence of adverse stereotypes is also apparent from minority law-
yers' common experience of being mistaken for low-income clients, or
for clerical and janitorial staff. In one recent report by the ABA's
Multicultural Women Attorneys Network, a black woman partner
from a major Chicago firm noted that she had been taken for a court
reporter at every deposition she had ever attended108
Such biases also are reflected and reinforced through various forms
of demeaning and harassing treatment. Women's contributions are
sory Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts, Achieving Equal Justice for Men and
Women in the Courts: Achieving Equal Justice in Litigation and Courtroom Interac-
tion 91 (1989); Discussion Draft, supra note 77, at 171; Dewey, supra note 101, at 19.
103. Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 Stan. L Rev. 2195,
2206 n.36 (1993).
104. Diane F. Norwood & Arlette Molina, Sex Discrinination in the Profession:
1990 Survey Results Reported, Tex. B.J., Jan. 1992, at 50, 51.
105. Resnik, supra note 103, at 2207.
106. Barbara F. Reskin, Bringing the Men Back In: Sex Differentiation and the De-
valuation of Women's Work, in The Social Construction of Gender, 141, 145-46
(Judith Lorber & Susan A. Farrell eds., 1991); Lott, The Devaluation of Women's
Competence, 41 J. Soc. Issues 43, 50 (1985); Michele A. Paludi & William D. Bauer,
Goldberg Revisited What's in an Author's Name, 9 Sex Roles 387 (1983).
107. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Eve, Mary, Superwoman" How Stereotypes About Wo-
men Influence Judges, 24 Judges J. 12, 15 (1985); see also Special Committee on Gen-
der, supra note 81; ABA Multicultural Women Attorneys Network, The Burdens of
Both, The Privileges of Neither (1994); Deborah Ruble Round, Note, Gender Bias in
the Judicial System, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2193, 2201 (1988); Edward A. Adams, ABA
Finds Minority Women in Law Face Tivice the Hurdles, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 8, 1994, at 1;
Dewey, supra note 101, at 20-22.
108. ABA Multicultural Women Attorneys Network, supra note 107; Adams, supra
note 107, at 1.
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often dismissed, devalued, or attributed to men. 10 9 Individuals who
have complained about sexual harassment have been dismissed as "ir-
rationa[l]" or "bounty hunter[s]," even when the harasser has a his-
tory of abusive conduct.110 The overwhelming majority of female
lawyers report experiencing discriminatory practices that convey a
lack of respect."' Women attorneys have had to cope with labels such
as "little lady," "young girl," "lawyerette," "pretty eyes," "baby doll,"
"sweetie," "sweetheart," and "attorney generalette." 2  Litigators
have encountered comments such as "Ladies and gentlemen, can you
believe this pretty little thing is an Assistant Attorney General?" or
"Do you really understand all the economics involved in this [anti-
trust] case?" 1" 3 Women of color face biases on two fronts. Racial
slurs have ranged from the obviously invidious, such as "tarbaby," to
the ostensibly benign, such as congratulations for being a "credit to
your race.""14
Except for overt racism, such comments rarely prompt any remedial
response. Women who object are frequently ridiculed as humorless or
oversensitive.' 5 A representative case in point involved a male attor-
ney who questioned prospective jurors on voir dire whether their deci-
109. For examples in the legal context, see Maryland Special Joint Committee,
Gender Bias in the Courts: Report of the Maryland Special Joint Committee on Gen-
der Bias in the Courts 260 (1989) (reporting that over half of surveyed women believe
judges give less weight to female attorneys' arguments); Gellis, supra note 102, at 941,
969-971 (noting that surveyed women believe women lawyers have less credibility,
and carry a greater burden of proof regarding their credibility). For examples in legal
education, see sources cited in Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Per-
spectives on Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1547, 1549-50 (1993). For more general
discussion, see Language, Gender and Society (Barrie Thorne et al. eds., 1983); Kath-
leen Reardon, The Memo Every Woman Keeps in Her Desk, in Reach for the Top 75,
76-77 (Nancy A. Nichols ed., 1994).
110. See the discussion of the sex harassment suit against Baker & McKenzie,
which resulted in a $7.1 million punitive damages award. Jane Gross, Cautionary Tale
for Lawyers: Suit on In-House Harassment, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1994, at Al; Victoria
Slind-Flor, Baker & McKenzie: Megafirm Socked on Punitives, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 12,
1994, at A4.
111. Gellis, supra note 102, at 971.
112. Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Com-
plaint Concerning the Honorable John J. Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Minn. 1984);
Marina Angel, Sexual Harassment by Judges, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 817, 820 (1991).
113. ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, supra note 80, at 10; Judicial Coun-
cil Advisory Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts, supra note 102, at 29.
114. Barbara Rabinovitz, Race Bias Commission Hears from Worcester, Mass. Law.
Wkly., Oct. 14, 1991, at 3; see also Salvatore Arena, Racial Slam for Courts: Panel
Faults State System, N.Y. Daily News, June 5, 1991, at 5; Jeannie Wong, Panel Hears
How Minorities See Court System, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 11, 1992, at B2.
115. ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, supra note 80, at 10. Judith Resnik
gives a representative example of the cost of complaining. "As one male lawyer [re-
sponding to the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Questionnaire] wrote: 'There arc a small
number of female attorneys... who seem to infer gender bias from almost any situa-
tion. These attorneys can be very unpleasant to be around and, in my opinion, hurt
their clients' cause.' " Resnik, supra note 103, at 2208 (quoting Discussion Draft,
supra note 77, at 60).
[Vol. 63
GENDER ROLES
sion would be influenced by the fact that his female opposing counsel
was "younger and prettier." When she objected, the judge responded
with a chuckle that she was "younger and prettier," although not ap-
parently a very good sport.1 16
Yet women who attempt to invoke humor themselves run other
risks. One California attorney, whose opposing counsel repeatedly
addressed her as "young lady," earned the judge's irritation when she
referred to her adversary as "old man." "I could hold you in con-
tempt," the judge pointed out. And he was not amused by her re-
sponse that she "wasn't the one who brought up age and sex."'117 Such
reactions both compound women's injury and discourage protests that
might prevent it. Even well-intentioned gallantry or seemingly trivial
asides can undercut female lawyers' status and credibility."1 '
The mismatch between characteristics traditionally associated with
women and those typically associated with professional success also
leaves female lawyers in a long standing double bind. They remain
vulnerable to criticism for being "too feminine" or "not feminine
enough.""' 9 What is assertive in a man is abrasive in a woman. A
wide array of experiential and clinical evidence indicates that proffiles
of successful professionals conflict with profiles of normal or ideal wo-
men. 2° The aggressiveness, competitiveness, and emotional detach-
ment traditionally presumed necessary for advancement in the most
prestigious and well-paid occupations are incompatible with traits
commonly viewed as attractive in women: cooperativeness, defer-
ence, sensitivity, and self-sacrifice.1 21 From most feminists' perspec-
tive, what needs to change are workplaces, not women.
116. Lynn Hecht Schafran, The Obligation to Intervene: New Direction from the
American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 53, 67
(1990).
117. For a related version of this story, see Women Lawyers Get Advice on Coun-
tering Sexual Bias, L.A. Times, March 5, 1993, at BI. For general discussion of the
penalties for complaining about such treatment, see ABA Comm. on Women in the
Profession, supra note 80, at 10; Gellis, supra note 102, at 971-72.
118. See ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, supra note 80, at 10.
119. Ann M. Morrison et al., Breaking the Glass Ceiling 54, 61-62 (1994). When
asked what constituted "too feminine," a typical manager's response was "it's hard to
explain." Id. at 79; see also Beth Milwid, What You Get When You Go For It 140
(1987) ("From some people I hear I have a reputation for being tough, but from other
people I hear the question, 'Is she tough enough?' I suppose it depends on who is
dealing with me.").
120. See sources cited in Dewey, supra note 101, at 21; see also Rhode, supra note
91, at 1164-66.
121. See supra note 106. Female attorneys have reported being called menopausal
or being asked if they were suffering from PMS when they objected to court rulings.
Hensler, supra note 73, at 2192. For an historical account of the mismatch between
traits viewed as desirable in women and in lawyers, see Michael Grossberg, Institu-
tionalizing Masculinity: The Law as a Masculine Profession, in Meanings for Man-
hood: Constructions of Masculinity in Victorian America 133, 145-49 (Marc C.
Carnes & Clyde Griffen eds., 1990); D. Kelly Weisberg, Barred from the Bar: Women
and Legal Education in the United States, 1870-1890, 28 J. Legal Educ. 504 (1977).
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Under current norms, female lawyers face continuing problems of
"fitting in" and forming the client and collegial relationships necessary
for advancement. In one representative survey, virtually all women
partners reported losing business because of gender.122 Female pro-
fessionals still do not have access to the same informal networks of
advice, collaboration, and contacts on which successful careers
depend.'23
To be sure, in many practice settings, the entrance of a critical mass
has brought significant improvements. Few female attorneys today
confront the situation that leaders of the bar can still recall, when
large institutions had only one or two women. Sol Linowitz, in re-
cently recounting such a description of his law school class, recalls that
his male colleagues were "somewhat uncomfortable when [their two
female classmates] were around." And, he acknowledges, "it never
occurred to us to wonder whether they felt uncomfortable."'2 4
Yet insensitivity to women's isolation and underrepresentation re-
mains a problem, particularly for lesbians and women of color. They
face unconscious discrimination on two fronts and their small numbers
amplify problems such as the absence of mentors and role models. 25
Racial and ethnic minorities often have additional recruitment and
committee responsibilities, while many lesbians are denied benefits or
social acceptance for their domestic partners. 126
Given all of these biases, women must work harder than men to
succeed. Those who do not advance under such circumstances or who
become frustrated and opt for different employment confirm the ad-
verse stereotypes that worked against their advancement in the first
122. Dewey, supra note 101, at 21.
123. Of the 55% of men who believe in the "old boy" network, 70% believe that it
helps male lawyers more than females. Over 90% of women believed that the "old
boy" network helps male lawyers more than females. Gellis, supra note 102, at 952;
see also ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, supra note 80, at 10; Epstein,
supra note 21, at 175; Rhode, supra note 91, at 1192; Louise A. LaMothe et al., Wo-
men as Rainmakers, Litig., Spr. 1991, at 29.
124. Sol M. Linowitz with Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession 6 (1994).
125. See Judicial Council of California, Achieving Equal Justice for Women and
Men in the Courts: Draft Report of the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on
Gender Bias in the Courts § 10 (1990); Kentucky Task Force on Gender Fairness in
the Courts, Equal Justice for Women and Men 8, 22, 35 (1992); Report and Recom-
mendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission,
"Where the Injured Fly for Justice": Reforming Practices Which Impede the Dispen-
sation of Justice to Minorities in Florida (1991); Geraldine Segal, Blacks in the Law
(1983); Steven Keeva, Unequal Partners: It's Tough at the Top for Minority Lawyers,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 50 (discussing problems of minority lawyers in large firms);
see also R. Mohr, Gays/Justice (1988); E.R. Shipp, Homosexual Lawyers Keep Fight-
ing Barriers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1989, at Bl.
126. See sources cited supra note 120. For guidelines set forth by the San Francisco
Bar Association on improving treatment of lesbian and gay attorneys in areas con-
cerning recruitment, hiring, retention, mentoring, compensation, benefits, childcare,
and social events, see Jane Goldman, Coming Out Strong, Cal. Law., Sept. 1992, at 31,
35.
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instance. The perception remains that women cannot succeed by con-
ventional standards, or are less committed to doing so than men. In
either event, female professionals do not warrant the same investment
in training, assistance, and other opportunities as their male counter-
parts. Women disproportionately drift off the occupational fast track,
leaving the most powerful sectors of the professions insulated from
alternative values. Again, the result is a subtle but self-perpetuating
cycle in which individual choices are constrained by gender biases.12z
2. Institutional Responses
Responses to these problems follow fairly obviously from the diag-
noses. One set of strategies involves strengthening professional regu-
lations and enforcement structures. In 1990, the American Bar
Association amended its Model Code of Judicial Conduct to require
judges to perform duties "without bias or prejudice" and to impose
similar mandates on others under their supervision, including any law-
yer practicing before them.12s Some states have adopted or consid-
ered similar prohibitions on discrimination for lawyers, and such a
proposal is pending before the ABA.'29 Although these later provi-
sions to some extent replicate existing state and federal civil rights
127. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 215-16; Harrington, supra note 4, at 253-54;
Rhode, supra note 85, at 165-75.
128. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(5) & (6) (1990).
129. Joanne Pitulla, Banning Bias-An Update, 5 Prof. Law. 1, 1 (1994) (discussing
proposed Model Rule 8.4 which would make it professional misconduct for a lawyer
to
knowingly manifest by words or conduct, in the course of representing a
client, bias or prejudice based upon race sex, religion, national origin, disa-
bility, age, sexual orientation or socio-economic status. This paragraph does
not apply to a lawyer's confidential communications to a client or preclude
legitimate advocacy with respect to the foregoing factors).
California's Rule 2-400, effective Mar. 1, 1994, prohibits unlawful discrimination in
employment and in accepting or terminating representation of a client on the basis of
race, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, religion, age, or disability. The State
Bar, however, may not initiate an investigation of such conduct "unless and until a
tribunal of competent jurisdiction... shall have first found that unlawful conduct
occurred." Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct 2-400 (1994). The New Jersey Rules of
Professional Conduct state:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in a professional
capacity, in conduct involving discrimination (except employment discrimi-
nation unless resulting in a final agency or judicial determination) because of
race, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital sta-
tus, socioeconomic status, or handicaps where the conduct is intended or
likely to cause harm.
NJ. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(g) (1990).
A Michigan proposal would prohibit lawyers from engaging in "invidious discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation, or eth-
nic origin" or belonging to an organization which the lawyer knows "invidiously
discriminates." Susan D. Gilbert & Michael P. Allen, Overcoming Discrimination in
the Legal Profession: Should the Model Rules be Changed?, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
933, 941 n.32 (1993).
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law, they may have symbolic importance, as well as practical value for
complainants seeking an additional or alternative enforcement
forum.
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A second set of initiatives involves workplace modifications. In-
creasing numbers of institutions have developed policies concerning
sexual harassment, hiring, retention, and mentoring, as well as the
family leave and part-time work provisions noted above. Many bar
associations and commissions also have developed model proposals
and training programs. 13 1 Some continuing legal education programs
and many law school professional responsibility courses include
materials on racial, ethnic, and gender issues.132 Efforts are also un-
derway to enlist organizational clients. For example, under the Cali-
fornia Minority Counsel Program, each participating corporation
agrees to hire and promote more lawyers of color, to use more minor-
ity-owned firms for outside legal work, and to encourage other firms
that it employs to assign lawyers of color to its cases. 33
Some of these provisions are relatively uncontroversial, at least in
principle, and are responsible for substantial progress. Perhaps most
significantly, "gender bias and the concerns of women are on the
agenda.' 34 That of itself represents a major advance. Although a
wide gap persists between documenting the problem and addressing it
effectively, the efforts obviously are related. In commenting on his
own attitude change, the judge who co-chaired the California Gender
Bias Task Force noted, "until I was on this ... Task Force, there never
was any gender bias in my court.'1 35 At least some men who initially
130. Gilbert & Allen, supra note 129, at 944-46. The usefulness of these provisions
is obviously limited if they require a prior finding of discrimination, or if they exclude
employment related conduct. See Randall Samborn, Ethics Codes Seek to Bar Dis-
crimination, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, at 1, 23 (noting that most states' anti-bias rules
exclude attorneys' non-employment-related actions); supra note 129.
131. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic
and Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 2143, 2149 (1993) (describing the Ninth Circuit
project on fairness in the courts, which instructs that the "distinct issues of women of
color" be part of the mandate to a relevant task force); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender
and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 181, 199-204 (1990); Soil, supra
note 68, at 633-35.
132. For example, California's continuing legal education requirement includes
coverage of bias, and such coverage is increasingly part of major legal ethics
casebooks. See Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics
(1992); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering (2d ed. 1993);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal Profession: Responsibility
and Regulation (3d ed. 1994); Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, supra note 28, at
969-71; Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive
Method, 42 J. Legal Educ. 31, 38 (1994).
133. The Minority Report, Cal. Law., June 1991, at 22.
134. New York Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts, Five Year Report of
the New York Judicial Committee on Women In the Courts 44 (June 1991).
135. Discussion Draft, supra note 77, at 171 (quoting David Rothman); see also
Schafran, supra note 70, at 69 (reporting that 19 of 22 surveyed male judges had never
observed a female litigator, witness or attorney being treated in a sex stereotyped
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perceive such issues as something only "militant" feminists or the
"girls want to talk about," subsequently come to recognize problems
initially assumed to be nonexistent. 136
Unsurprisingly, however, initiatives that appear to involve preferen-
tial treatment often cause resentment, particularly when they benefit
white women. As critics note, these women have not suffered the
same history of economic and educational deprivation as minorities,
and are no longer grossly underrepresented in the profession's hiring
pool. Singling out either group for what appears to be "special assist-
ance" can also reinforce the very assumption of inferiority that femi-
nists seek to challenge. Even when white women or minority lawyers
perform effectively, if their presence can be attributed to affirmative
action, their performance can be devalued accordingly.
Yet while the price of preferential policies may be substantial, so
too is the cost of doing nothing. Special treatment risks stigmatizing
underrepresented groups, but the fact of underrepresentation is stig-
matizing as well. Patricia Williams made the point in her description
of a 1990 MacNeil/Lehrer profile of faculty hiring at Harvard Law
School. Administrators explained that:
Harvard Law School cannot find one black woman on the entire
planet who is good enough to teach there, because we're all too
stupid. (Well, that's not precisely what was said. It was more like
they couldn't find anyone smart enough. To be fair, what Associate
Dean Louis Kaplow actually said was that Harvard would have to
'lower its standards,' which of course Harvard simply cannot do.) 137
Four years later, when this article went to press, Harvard's sixty-some
faculty still had never hired a woman of color.
Preferential treatment may carry a price, but the relevant question
is always, compared to what? Barbara Babcock, former Assistant At-
torney General in the Carter Administration, put the point directly
when asked how she felt about gaining her position because she was a
woman. "It feels better than being denied the position because you're
a woman." In contexts where equality in form is insufficient to secure
equality in fact, preferential treatment generally is worth the cost. To
reach a social order in which wealth, power, and status are not distrib-
uted by gender, we must first dispel the stereotypes contributing to
this distribution. Affirmative action is often crucial to that effort.
Only by insuring a critical mass of professional women and men of
color can we counter the prejudices that underpin subordination. 13
manner); Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts, supra
note 102, at 90.
136. Schafran, supra note 131, at 204 (quoting New Jersey Judge Scalera); Soil,
supra note 68, at 640 (quoting members of the Supreme Court Committee on Judicial
College Seminars and members of the New Jersey bench).
137. Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 5 (1991).
138. For more extended discussion, see Rhode, supra note 85, at 184-90.
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American lawyers have long been leaders in the national struggle
for gender equality. The challenge remaining is to confront the
problems in their own profession and to translate egalitarian commit-
ments into workplace reorganization.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the nineteenth century, anti-feminists based much of
their opposition to women professionals on assumptions about wo-
men's difference. As one state judge explained when excluding fe-
male candidates from the bar, the "peculiar qualities of womanhood,
its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, its tender susceptibility" were
surely not qualifications for "forensic strife."' 39
Ironically enough, these are the same sensibilities that many con-
temporary feminists hope will transform professional culture. Yet un-
like their predecessors, these latest invocations of difference need not
rest on some exaggerated perception of woman's essential nature.
Rather, contemporary feminists can ground their aspirations in values
traditionally associated with women under particular social
circumstances.
For centuries, as Virginia Woolf observed, women were spectators
at the "procession of educated men."' 40 From the sidelines, women
watched as men marched. Once the bars to membership broke down,
women could ask some fundamental questions. Should women join
the existing parades? On what terms? "Above all, where is it taking
us, the procession of educated men?"'' The challenge for contempo-
rary feminists is to refocus attention on these issues. With the en-
trance of new members in the profession comes an opportunity to
rethink its traditional destinations.
139. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875).
140. Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas 62-63 (1938).
141. Id.
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